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THE SPORT OF NUMBERS: MANIPULATING TITLE IX TO
RATIONALIZE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN

l.

INTRODUCTION

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is one of the most
important pieces of federal legislation passed to exclude sex
discrimination from all educational forums and promote equality for
girls and women. 1 Most notably Title IX is known for its advancements
in female athletics by requiring "members of both sexes to have equal
opportunities to participate in sports and receive the benefits of
competitive athletics." 2
Furthermore, Title IX requires athletic
scholarships, benefits, and opportunities to be allocated equitably and it
requires effective accommodation of student interests and abilities. 3
On June 27, 2002, the Secretary of the Department of Education
("OED"), Rodney Paige, created the Commission on Opportunities in
Athletics ("Commission") in recognition of Title IX's thirtieth
anniversary. 4
The purpose of the Commission was to "collect
information, analyze issues, and obtain broad public input directed at
improving the application of current Federal standards for measuring
equal opportunity for men, women, boys and girls to participate in
athletics under Title IX." 5 After eight months of review, the Commission
suggested approximately twenty-three recommendations for Title IX
reform" in a report entitled "Open to All: Title IX at Thirty."
Many of the recommendations in the report are targeted at achieving
serious changes in how athletics departments comply with Title IX; and

1.

20 U.S.C. § 16Hl (2002).

2. National Women's Law Center, The Battlcf(n Gender Equity in Athletics: Title IX at Thirty
1 <http:/ I www. n wlc.org/ pdf/ Battle%20f(Jr%20C ;ender%20 Equi ty%20in %20A thletics%20Report. pdf>
(June 2002) [hereinafter NWLC Battle].
3. 44 Fed. Reg. 71413-71423 (Dec. 11, 1979) (Policy interpretation offered by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare regarding intercollegiate athletic provisions of Title
!X of the Education Amendments of 1972 and its implementing regulations.).

4. U.S. Department of Education, "Open to All:" Title IX at Thirty, The Secretary of
Educatim1's Commissi<m on Opportunity in Athletics, 1 <http://www.cd.gov/pub/titleixat30/title9_
report. pdf> (Feb. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Commission RejJort].
5. Id. at 46.
6.

/d. all.
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more significantly, some recommendations "reduce the [athletic]
opportunities and scholarships to which women and girls are entitled
under the law." 7 A three-part compliance test established in 1979 offers
institutions three independent ways to show that they are providing
equal athletic opportunities to their male and female students.x However,
many of the Commission's recommendations manipulate the ways in
which schools count athletic participation by men and women under that
three-part test. 9 In essence, some of these recommendations dilute the
impact and significance of each of the prongs of the test at the cost of
female participation. Title IX' s purpose is to prevent discrimination
against women in educational forums, but by diluting Title IX's mandate,
the Commission is justifying and rationalizing on-going discrimination
against women.
In response to the Commission's report, the DED issued a letter on
July 11, 2003, entitled, Further Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics
Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance. 10 In the letter, the DED
recognized that discrimination against female athletes still exists and
must be addressed by aggressive enforcement of Title IX. 11 In addition,
the DED stated that it would undertake a campaign to help educational
institutions better understand the three-part compliance test and work
consistently with institutions in implementing Title IX. 12 Ironically, the
DED did not comment on the Commission's recommendations. The
DED could adopt any of these recommendations in the future, which in
turn, could adversely affect athletic opportunities for women and girls.
This paper will analyze the Commission's recommendations aimed
at lowering the level of compliance required to satisfy the current threepart test. Part II of this paper will explore the creation and enactment of
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Part III will survey the
expansion of Title IX protection to include athletic opportunities, and
how such expansion has been interpreted by the courts and the DED.
Part IV will explore the creation and mandate of the Secretary of
Education's Commission on Opportunity in Athletics. Part V will
critically analyze the Commission's recommendations against the current
7. National Women's l.aw Center, Title IX Commission's Drafi Report Ignores Continuing
Discrimination Against Women & Girls, Says NWLC <http://www.nwlc.org/details.cfm'id= 1310
&section=newsroom> (February 20, 2003) [hercinafier NWLC Draji Report Ignores].
8. 44Fed. Reg. 71418(Dec.ll, 1979).
9. See Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 33-40.

10. Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education,

Further Clart(ication of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance
<http:/ /www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/title'JguidanccFinal.html> (July II, 2003).
II. !d.
12.

hi.
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legal backdrop of Title IX, focusing on specific recommendations which,
if adopted, will directly contravene standing case law precedents.
Specifically, Part V will address the positive federal appellate court
treatment of the current Title IX policies, the likelihood that certain
changes to such policies would be judicially overturned, and the
inconsistency of these recommendations with current DED policies and
Title IX itself.
In particular, Section A of Part V will address Commission
recommendations that allow institutions to creatively count student
enrollment and athletic participation in order to maintain enrollment-toathletics ratios that meet the first test of compliance-substantial
proportionality. However, as will be shown, such creative counting
would actually mask the ongoing sex discrimination against women in
athletics. Section B will investigate two recommendations that would
permit institutions to perform interest surveys to demonstrate that the
institution has satisfied the third test of compliance by fully and
effectively accommodating the interests of the underrepresented sex.
Part VI will conclude the paper by addressing current Title IX policies
that effectively promote both men's and women's athletics and should
properly remain intact and be vigorously enforced.
II.

THE BIRTH OF TITLE IX

Prior to the adoption of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, many colleges and universities discriminated against female
students in a number of educational aspects. 13 One key forum of
discrimination was athletics. 14 Many women were not only denied
opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics, but were also
denied the significant benefits of athletic scholarships. 15 In the late 1960s,
Congress began to examine these disparities by investigating educational
institutions and their discriminatory policies against women. 16 The
House Special Subcommittee on Education held extensive hearings in
1970 and found "massive, persistent patterns of discrimination against
women in the academic world." 17 Congress passed the Title IX bill as a
remedy and President Richard Nixon signed it into law on June 23,

U. 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972). In 1972, women represented fewer than 30,000 college and
fewer than 300,000 high school athletic participants. In contrast, men represented approximately
170,000 college and 3.6 million high school athletes. NWLC Battle, supra n. 2, at 5.
14. Cohen v. Brown U., 991 f.2d 888,894 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Cohen I].
15.

/d.

IIi.

Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 14.

17.

118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972).
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1972. 18
Title IX prohibits federally funded education programs and activities
from engaging in sex discrimination. 19 "Title IX's prohibitions against
sex discrimination are broad and its mandate applies to all educational
activities" 20 and all levels of education that receive federal funding-from
elementary schools to universities. 21 Title IX was passed with two key
objectives: "to avoid the use of federal resources to support
discriminatory practices;" and "to provide individual citizens effective
protection against those practices." 22 To accomplish these goals,
Congress directed all federal agencies extending financial assistance to
educational institutions to develop procedures for terminating financial
assistance to institutions that violated Title IX. 23
III.

LEGAL HISTORY AND STATUTORY AMENDMENTS

To further the successful administration of Title IX, Congress
approved the Javits amendment in 1974, which required the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"), 24 through its Office of Civil
Rights ("OCR"), to promulgate regulations for determining compliance
with Title IX. 25
In 1975, OCR issued its first set of regulations to provide guidance to

18. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 14.
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
20. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) [hereinafter
CRRA]. CRRA is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994). CRRA directly overturned Grove City v. Bell,
465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984), which held that Title IX did not apply to an entire institution, but rather
only to those departments that directly received federal funds.
21. NWLC Battle, supra n. 2, at 3. However, there are several statutory exclusions from Title
IX including religious and military institutions. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(3)-(a)(4).
22. Cannon v. U. of Chi., 441 U.S 677, 704 (1979) (where the Court interpreted the objectives
of Title IX, citing to comments in the Congressional Record as support for its interpretations).
23. 20 u.s.c. § 1682 (2002).
24. "[I]n 1979, Congress split HEW into the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and the Department of Education (DED)." Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895 (citation omitted). The
existing Title IX regulations "were left within HHS's arsenal while ... DED replicated them as part of
its own regulatory armamentarium." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, DED is the principle agency
of policy enforcement. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(l) (2002) (transferring all education fuuctions
of HEW to DED) and 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(3) (2002) (transferring education-related Office of Civil
Rights work to DED)). Notably, HHS's and DED's regulations are identical except for the change in
language necessitated by splitting HEW into HHS and DED. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895.
25. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 15. See Cohen v. Brown U., 101 F.3d 155, 165 (lst Cir.
1996) [hereinafter Cohen II] (discussing the scope of Title IX and effect on university's athletics
programs). In addition, in 1974, Congress rejected the Tower Amendment, which would have
excluded revenue-producing sports from Title IX jurisdiction. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 15.
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university athletic programs on how to interpret Title IXY' These
regulations made it clear that gender discrimination in intercollegiate
athletics was a violation of Title IXY A section entitled, "Equal
Opportunity," explained that a recipient of federal funding must
"provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes." 28 To
determine whether universities were providing equal opportunities under
Title IX, the Director of HEW was to consider specific factors, including:
( l) whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate[ d) the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) the provision of equipment and supplies; (3) scheduling of games
and practice time; (4) travel and per diem allowance; (5) opportunity to
receive coaching and academic tutoring; (6) assignment and
compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) provision of locker rooms,
practice and competitive facilities; (8) provision of medical and training
facilities and services; (9) provision of housing and dining facilities and
services; [and] (lO) publicity. 29

HEW further explained that unequal expenditures for men's and
women's teams would not necessarily constitute a violation of this
section, but that the Secretary could consider such factors in his or her
overall assessment of equality. 311 In this set of regulations, HEW focused
on compliance through equal opportunity instead of compliance through
equal expenditure.ll
In 1978, in response to more than fifty university discrimination
complaints, HEW issued a set of proposed "Policy Interpretations" to
clarify the obligations of federal aid recipients under Title IX. 32 The
Policy Interpretation was promulgated in final form in 1979 33 and
provided three areas of interests in determining compliance: (1) Athletic
Financial Assistance (Scholarships); (2) Equivalence in Other Athletic
Benefits and Opportunities; and (3) Effective Accommodation of Student
Interests and Abilities. 34
In the second section of the Policy
Interpretations, the regulations listed the above non-exhaustive list of

26. U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Reading Room, Sex
Discrimination/Title IX, 1975 Memorandum to Chief State School Officers <http:/ /www.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/ docs/holmes.html> (Nov. 11, 1975).
27. 34 CF.R. §§ 106.37(c), 106.41 (2000).
28. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2000).
29. 34 C.F.R at§ 106.41(c)(1 )-(10).
30. 34 C.F.R. at 106.41(c).
31. Megan K. Starace, Reverse Discrimination Under Title IX: Do Men Have a Sporting
Chance?, R Viii. Sports & Ent. L.). 1R9, 193 (2001).
32. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 166.
33. 44 Fed. Reg. 71413,71413-71423 (Dec. 11, 1979).
34. /d.at714l3.
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factors to be considered in determining whether equal opportunities are
available to both genders. 35 Of utmost importance is the third section,
which establishes the "effective accommodation" test. 3" This test states
that compliance under Title IX depends on an affirmative response to
one of the following three questions:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male
and female students are provided in numbers substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments; or

(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a
history and continuing practice of program expansion which is
demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the
members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can
be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that
sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present
program. 37

After the Policy Interpretations were issued, the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the language and intent of the regulations in
a number of its decisions, adding another dimension to Title IX's
enforcement. 3x In a non-athletic suit, the Supreme Court held in Cannon
v. University of Chicago 39 that Title IX provides an implicit right of action
for an individual affected by a violation of Title IX. 40 In Cannon, a female
petitioner brought suit under Title IX after she was denied medical
school admission at two private universities, alleging that these schools
discriminated against her on the basis of sex. 41 The Court noted that the
language of Title IX "does not ... expressly authorize a private right of
action by a person injured by [such] a violation." 42 Nonetheless, the
Court engaged in a lengthy analysis to determine whether it was

35. ld. at 71417.
36. Id. at 71418.
37. ld.
38. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (stating there is an individual right of action under Title IX);
Grove City, 465 U.S. at 573 (holding that Title IX only applied to specific departments receiving
Federal financial assistance); and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. S(hs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (I 9'!2)
(asserting that a private party could collect money damages under Title IX).
39.

Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677-749.

40. /d.at717.
41. /d. at 680.
42. Id. at 683.
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Congress's intent to provide a special class of litigants with a private
action remedy. 41 Overall, the Court held that Title IX was patterned after
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which courts have found to
provide a private remedy. 44 The Court noted in conclusion that private
rights are best created by Congress, but also recognized that in limited
circumstances, Congress's failure to do so "is not inconsistent with an
intent ... to have such remedy available .... "45 Thus, the Court's
decision allowed educational institutions to be sued in court by private
parties, rather than only being subject to investigation by OCR. 46
In 1984, there was some uncertainty as to whether Title IX applied
only to the specific program receiving federal funding or to the entire
educational institution. The Supreme Court resolved the issue in Grove
City College v. Bell, 47 by narrowly holding that Title IX only applied to the
particular department receiving the federal financial assistance, and not
to the entire institution. 4H The two significant issues presented in Grove
City were (1) whether Title IX applied to Grove City College through
indirect federal grants used by students to finance their education and, if
so, (2) whether the federal assistance to that program could be
terminated because the college refused to comply with Title IX. 49
First, the Court found that Title IX did not distinguish between
direct institutional assistance and aid received by the school through its
students. 50
The Court, considering clear statutory language and
Congressional intent, construed the phrase "receiving Federal financial
assistance" to include both direct and indirect methods of assistance. 5 1
The Court then analyzed whether any particular educational
43. /d. at 688-·710 (The four factors the Court considered were(!) "whether the statute was
enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member[;]" (2) whether "legislative
history ... expressly create[d] or den[ied] a private remedy ... [;]" (3) whether "a private remedy
should not be implied if it would frustrate the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme[;]" and
( 4) "whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject matter involves an area
basically of concern to the States.").
44.

/d. at 702.

45. /d. at 717.
46. /d.
47.
48.

Grove City, 465 U.S. at 555.

/d. at 573.

49. /d. at 558. The Court considered a third issue, whether applying Title IX to Grove City
infringes on the First Amendment rights of the college or its students. /d. On this particular issue,
the Court concluded that Congress has the ability to "attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions
to federal fina1o1cial assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept." /d. at 575.
Therefore, Grove City and its students can either accept the federal grants with the requirements or
they can decline the usc of the federal grants and not be subjected to such requirements. Id.
50.

/d. at 564.

51. /d. at 569.
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program or activity of the college could be characterized as "receiving"
federal assistance through grants of its students. 52 The fact that federal
funds eventually reached the College's general operating budget was not
enough to subject the entire College to Title IX compliance. 53 Rather the
Court held that when federal assistance is earmarked to the recipient's
financial aid program, the particular department or activity must meet
Title IX compliance, not the entire institution. 54 However, few athletic
departments receive federal funds directly, so this ruling essentially
removed nearly every university's athletic program from the scope of
Title IX.
Congress responded to Grove City by adopting the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987 ("CRRA"). 55 In its findings, Congress asserted
that recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court impermissibly
narrowed the broad application of Title IX. 56 Congress passed the CRRA
to "restore the prior consistent and long-standing executive branch
interpretation and broad, institution-wide application of those laws as
previously administered." 57 Regarding the Education Amendments, the
Act states that Title IX applies to "all of the operations" of an educational
institution, "any part of which is extended federal financial assistance." 58
Congress thereby reinstated Title IX's broad interpretation by clarifying
that all programs at an educational institution receiving federal funding
fall under the jurisdiction of OCR.
The Supreme Court further expanded the reach of Title IX's
enforcement in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools. 59 Christine
Franklin, a student at North Gwinnett High School, brought a suit
alleging that the administration knowingly took no action to halt the
continual sexual harassment she received from Andrew Hill, a teacher
and coach employed by the district." 0 The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the case and the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by stating that monetary
damages could not be sustained for an alleged intentional violation of
Title IX. 61 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding
52. Id.
53. Id. at 572.
54. Id.at573-74.
55. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). The Act, as amended, is codified at 20 U.S.C:
§ 1687 (1994).

56. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28.
57. Jd.
58. 20 u.s.c. § 1687(4).
59. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 60.
60. Id. at 63-64.
6 L I d. at 64-65.
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that a private party could collect money damages in a Title IX lawsuit. 62
The Court relied on Cannon v. University of Chicago, which held that
Title IX is enforceable through an implied right63 and the general
common law rule that "where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." 64 Even
though the Legislature that passed Title IX did not specify a remedy, the
Court analyzed the state of the law at the time of enactment and
concluded that Congress did not intend to limit the remedies available in
a Title IX suit. 65 In so doing, the Court significantly broadened Title IX's
enforcement by allowing a damages remedy for an action to enforce Title
IX. 66
In addition to the Supreme Court's interpretations of Title IX, other
bodies have contributed to the understanding of Title IX. In 1990, OCR
published the Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual to help aid in Title
IX investigations of intercollegiate and interscholastic athletic
programs. 67 The manual is based on the 1979 Policy Interpretations and
outlines general areas of compliance, scholarship, other athletic benefits
and opportunities, and the effective accommodation of students. 68
Furthermore, it explains the procedures OCR personnel should follow in
investigating university athletic programs and provides consistency in
enforcement. 69
In 1994, Congress passed the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act,
which requires educational institutions to disclose statistical information
regarding the gender of athletes and general enrollment at universities
and colleges?0 These annual reports are rather detailed in that they
require the participating schools to report the number of full-time
undergraduates, listing of all varsity teams, number of participants,
operating expenses, coach salaries, money spent on athletically related
student aid, ratio of student aid awarded between male and females, and
total revenues from each sport. 71 This self-reporting is an essential
element of OCR enforcement because it alleviates OCR of the burden of
62. I d. at 76.
63. Id. at 65.
64. Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 23
(1783)).

Id. at 72.
66. Id. at 76.
67. Valerie M. Bonnette & Lamar Daniel, Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual I (1990)
[hereinafter Investigator's Manual].
68. Id. at 1-2.
65.

69. Id.

70. 20 U.S. C.§ 1092(g) (1994).
71.

Id.
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acquiring these statistics by itself.
More recently in the courtroom, eight of thirteen federal appellate
courts have followed the established legal precedent of giving deference
to reasonable regulations of administrative agencies and have sustained
the legality of the three-part test. 72 The First Circuit in Cohen v. Brown
University decided the most significant case in a series of opinions
upholding the three-part test. 73 Due to budget cuts, in 1991, Brown
University demoted two men's teams-water polo and golf-and two
women's teams-gymnastics and volleyball-from university-funded to
donor-funded varsity status. 74 In Cohen I, female student-athletes sued
Brown University claiming that Brown violated Title IX by demoting
these two women's athletic teams. 75 The plaintiffs argued that "Brown's
decision to devalue the two women's programs without first making
sufficient reduction in men's activities or ... adding other women's
teams to compensate for the loss" 76 failed to effectively and fully
accommodate the interests and abilities of the student body. 77
The court's analysis relied heavily on the Policy Interpretation's
three-prong test for compliance. 78 To comply with Title IX, Brown had
to satisfy one of the three prongs. 79 With regard to the first prong
concerning substantial proportionality, the court stated that compliance
with this prong creates "a safe harbor for those institutions that have
distributed
athletic
opportunities
in
numbers
'substantially
proportionate' to the gender composition of their student bodies."xo At
the time of the suit, Brown's student body was approximately 52% male
and 48% female while its athletic roster was 63.3% male and only 36.7%
72. See Chalenor v. U. of N.D., 291 I' .3d 1042, 1046-48 (8th Cir. 2002); Pederson v. La. St. U.,
213 F.3d 858, 879 (5th Cir. 2000); Neal v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cal. St. U., 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir.
1999); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Assn., 43 F.3d 265, 277-75 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelley v. Bd. of
Trustees, U. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265,270 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995); Cohen I, 991
F.2d 888; Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 170, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Roberts v. Colo. St. Rd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824,828 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Williams v. Sch. Dist. of
Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1993).
73. Cohen v. Brown U., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992); affd, Cohen/, 991 F.2d 888; on remand
to Cohen v. Brown U., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995); ajj'd in part, rev'd in part, Cohen II, 101 F.3d
155. While this paper mentions all f(mr cases, the paper emphasizes the First Circuit opinions. For
this reason, the First Circuit opinions are labeled Cohen I and Cohen II (for simplicity), even though
one of the district court opinions precedes Cohen I and the second follows Cohen I and precedes
Cohen II.
74. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 892.
75. !d.
76. I d. at 893.
77. Id. at 897.
78. Id. at 896-98.
79. Id.
80. !d. at 897.
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female.s 1 The court found that the student population and athletic
composition were not substantially proportionate to each other and,
therefore, Brown failed the first prong of the compliance test.s 2
Next, the court assessed whether Brown was in compliance with the
second prong of the test.s 3 Under this second option, Brown could
comply with Title IX by showing "a history and continuing practice of
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing
interest and abilities" of the underrepresented gender.s 1 The First Circuit
affirmed the lower court's finding that Brown did not meet the second
prong of compliance.Ho The court held that although Brown's women's
athletic programs developed significantly in the 1970s, the University did
not continue this development in the 1980s and 1990s and therefore
failed the second prong of the compliance test.x 6
The final prong of the compliance test is met by ensuring that the
interests and abilities of the members of the underrepresented sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program. 87
Again, the court concluded that there was enough interest and talent on
the campus to support women's volleyball and gymnastics and therefore,
by canceling these programs Brown failed the third prong by not fully
and effectively accommodating the interests of female students at the
University.ss Because Brown failed all three prongs of the compliance
test, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction,
which reinstated the women's volleyball and gymnastics teams.xY
In 1996, the First Circuit faced these issues again in Cohen 1I. 911 Upon
remand from Cohen I, the district court had found Brown to be in
violation of Title IX and ordered that Brown submit a comprehensive
plan for complying with Title IX.Y 1 Brown's compliance plan was later
rejected by the district court and the court ordered specific relief. 92
Brown then appealed this order to the First Circuit. 93 In Cohen II, Brown
argued that "an athletics program equally accommodates both genders

81.

!d. at 892.

82. !d. at 903.
83. ld. at 897.
84.

!d.

85.

/d. at 903.

86. !d.
87.

Jd. at 904.

8R

I d.

89.

/d. at 907.

90.

Cohen /1, 101 !'.3d at 155.

91. ld. at 161.
92. Id. at 162.
93.

/d.
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and complies with Title IX if it accommodates the relative interests and
abilities of its male and female students." 94 The First Circuit rejected this
comparative-level-of-interest argument because, in essence, Brown was
stating that more males are interested in athletics than females. 95 The
court found that Brown's reasoning was based on impermissible
stereotypes, which "disadvantage [d] women and undermine [d] the
remedial purposes of Title IX by limiting required program expansion
for the underrepresented sex to the status quo level of relative interests." 96
The court went one step further and rejected statistical evidence assessing
the level of women's interest in sports, noting that such evidence by itself
cannot justify providing fewer athletic opportunities to women because it
is "only a measure of the very discrimination that is and has been the
basis for women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports." 97
Furthermore, such evidence was completely irrelevant in Brown's case
because women's interest in sports was evident through the viable and
successful women's varsity teams which were demoted. 9 H The First
Circuit's decisions in Cohen I and Cohen II have shaped and defined the
standard for Title IX compliance under the three-prong effective
accommodation test.
In the midst of the Cohen decisions, OCR recognized the confusion
regarding the proper application of the three-part test of Title IX
compliance and, in January 1996, issued a Clarification Memo which
specifically elaborated on how to properly apply the test. 99 The memo
reiterates that for an institution to be in compliance with Title IX, that
institution is required to satisfy only one prong of the three-prong test. 100
The memo fully addresses each prong of compliance and sets forth
examples illustrating proper and improper compliance with Title IX
under each prong. 101
First, the Clarification Memo addresses prong one-the substantial
94. !d. at 174.

95. Id. The court noted that Brown's relative interest approach reads the "full" out of the duty
to accommodate "fully and effectively." Prong three requires "not merely some accommodation, but
full and effective accommodation." Id. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Cohen I,
991 F.2d at 898-99). After Cohen If's decision, the Ninth Circuit also rejected the notion that the
third prong of the three-part test could be satisfied by merely "relative" rather than full
accommodation. Neal, 198 F.3d at 768-70.
96.

Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 174 (citing Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 209).

97. Id. at 179-80.

98. ld. at 180.
99. Norma V. Cantu, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part
Test 1 <http:/ /www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/claritlc.html>) (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter
Clarification Memo].

I 00. ld. at 2.
101. ld.at4-12.
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proportionality test. 102 The memo defines "participant" to include walkon athletes 103 and states that participation rates are based on an
institution's full-time undergraduate enrollment as compared to the
institution's intercollegiate athletic program. 104 Because this test uses a
case-specific analysis, strict numerical proportions are not necessarily
required under particular circumstances; this allows for natural
fluctuations in enrollment and participation rates as well as situations
when the number of additional athletic opportunities required to achieve
substantial proportionality would not be sufficient to sustain a viable
team. 105
Next, the memo discusses the second test-history and continuing
practice. 10" The memo clarifies that "developing interests include
interests that already exist at the institution." 107 Further, there are no
fixed time intervals for compliance and no particular number of sports is
dispositive. 108 However, the memo notes that DED "will not find a
history ... of program expansion where an institution [only] increases
the proportional participation . . . by reducing opportunities for the
overrepresented sex .... " 109 Nor will DED find compliance under this
test when an institution "establishe[s] teams for the underrepresented sex
only at the initiation of its program ... or [when an institution] merely
promises to expand its program ... in the future." 110 The focus of test
two is on program expansion that is responsive to the developing
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex. 111
The Clarification Memo also discusses the third test-full and
effective accommodation of the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented sex. 112 The students whose interests must be evaluated
are current and admitted students; the university is not required to
102.

Id. at 2.

103. Id. at 5-6 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. at 75415) (Participants include individuals: "(a) who are
receiving the institutionally-sponsored support normally provided to athletes competing at the
institution ... ; and (b) who are participating in organized practice sessions and other team meetings
and activities on a regular basis during a sport's season; and (c) who are listed on the eligibility or
squad lists maintained for each sport, or (d) who, because of injury, cannot meet a, b, or c above but
continue to receive financial aid on the basis of athletic ability.").
104. Id. at 6.
105. Id. at 6-7.
106. Id. at 7.
107.

Id.

108. I d.
109. Id. at 8.
110. Id.
111. ld.at7.
112. Id. at 9.
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consider the interests of potential students. 113 High athletic participation
of the overrepresented sex does not necessarily indicate that an
institution is not in compliance with Title IX, as long as there is evidence
that the "imbalance does not reflect discrimination .... " 114 In this
situation, the memo states that DED will consider whether "there is (a)
unmet interest in particular sports; 115 (b) sufficient ability to sustain a
team in the sport; 116 and (c) a reasonable expectation of competition for
the team." 117
The Clarification Memo concludes by recapping that the three-part
test provides an institution with flexibility for compliance.m The memo
also clearly states that "nothing in the three-part test requires an
institution to eliminate participation opportunities for men." 119

IV.

THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION'S COMMISSION ON
OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS

In 2002, Title IX celebrated its thirtieth anniversary amidst the

113. Id. at 9.
114. Id.at9-JO.
115.

Id. at 10. Interes1 will be evaluated by numerous indicators such as:

requests by students and admitted students that a particular sport be added; requests that an
existing club sport be elevated to intercollegiate team status; participation in particular club or
intramural sports; interviews with students, admitted students, coaches, administrators and

others regarding interest in particular sports; results of questionnaires of students and admitted
students regarding interests in particular sports; and participation in particular interscholastic
sports by admitted students.
Id. Interest can also be ascertained by looking at participation rates in high schools, amateur
association, and community leagues. Id. Assessments of student interest should be straightforward,
reach a wide audience of students, and be open-ended in sports towards which athletic interests can
be expressed. Id.
116.

Id. at 11. The examination of indications of ability will include:

the athletic experience and accomplishment-in interscholastic, club or intramural
competition-of students and admitted students interested in playing the sport; opinions of
coaches, administrators, and athletes at the institution regarding whether interested students
and admitted students have the potential to sustain a varsity team; and if the team has
previously competed at the club or intramural level, whether the competitive experience of the
team indicates that it has the potential to sustain an intercollegiate team.
Id. Most importantly, poor competitive record or inability to have teams play at the same level as
other athletics programs is not conclusive evidence of lack of ability. Id.
117. /d. Reasonable expectation will be determined by looking at competitive opportunities in
the geographic area including "competitive opportunities offered by other schools against which the
institution competes; and competitive opportunities offered by other schools in the institution's
geographic area, including those offered by schools against which the institution does not now
compete." Id.
118. Id. at 11.

119. Id.
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growing debate over the effectiveness of Title IX's enforcement. 120
College administrators claimed that OCR failed to provide clear guidance
on how to comply with Title IX; interest groups alleged that OCR did not
effectively enforce Title IX; and certain men's teams claimed reverse
discrimination. 121 In June 2002, Secretary of Education Rodney Paige
created the Commission on Opportunity in Athletics to respond to this
growing public debate. 122 Secretary Paige charged the Commission to
"collect information, analyze issues, and obtain broad public input
directed at improving the application of current Federal standards." 123
After eight months of fact-finding, the Commission compiled its
findings and recommendations for improving the enforcement of Title
IX. 124 The Commission found that: (1) "great progress has been made

120. Commission Report, supra n. 4, app. 3 at 46.
121. Id.
122. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at I. The structure of the Commission was composed of
fifteen members appointed by the Secretary of Education from public and private sectors and three
ex officio members from the OED. !d. app. 3, at 47. Ten of the fifteen commissioners were affiliated
with NCAA Division 1-A athletics ranging from athletics directors, coaches, a division
commissioner, and a University President. !d. app. 5, at 53-56. Eight of the fifteen members were
women. Id. Among these women were impressive athletes, such as a former WNBA player, a twotime Olympian, and a captain of the U.S. Women's National Soccer Team. /d. Ironically, no
Commissioners represented Division II, Division lll, junior or community colleges, or high school
athletic programs, even though the Commission's Charter specifically stated that "members shall
include representatives of ... intercollegiate and secondary school athletes." !d. app. 3, at 47.
123. !d. app. 3, at 46. Specifically, Secretary Paige charged the Commission to address seven
key questions:
(I) Are Title IX standards for assessing equal opportunity in athletics working to promote
opportunities for male and female athletes?
(2) Is there adequate Title IX guidance that enables colleges and school districts to know what is
expected of them and to plan for an athletic program that effectively meets the needs and
interests of their students?
(3) Is further guidance or other steps needed at the junior and senior high school levels, where
the availability or absence of opportunities will critically affect the prospective interests and
abilities of student athletes when they reach college age'
(4) How should activities[,! such as cheerleading or bowling[,! factor into the analysrs of
equitable opportunities'
(5) How do revenue producing and large-roster teams affect the provision of equ<~l athletic
opportunities? The Department has heard from some parties that whereas some men athletes
will "walk on" to intercollegiate teams-without athletic financial aid and without having been
recruited-women rarely do this. ls this accurate and, if so, what are its implications for Title
IX analysis?
(6) In what ways do opportunities in other sport venues, such as the Olympics, professional
leagues, and community recreation programs, interact with the obligations of colleges and
school districts to provide equal athletic opportunity' What are the implications for Title lX'
(7) Apart from Title IX enforcement, are there other efforts to promote athletic opportunities
for male and female students that the Department might support, such as public-private
partnerships to support the efforts of schools and colleges in this area'
Commission Report, supra n. 4, app. 3 at 4H.

124. /d. at I.
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[under Title IX], but more needs to be done to create opportunities for
women and girls and retain opportunities for boys and men;" 125 (2) many
institutions feel that they must meet the first prong of the compliance
test, the proportionality requirement, to ensure a "safe harbor," and this
has been a factor in their decision to cut or cap men's teams; 126 (3)
increasing operational costs have threatened compliance with Title IX; 127
(4) there is great confusion about how Title IX requirements and
enforcement can be strengthened; 128 and (5) artificial limits on walk-on
opportunities do not benefit anyone. 129
From these findings, the Commission set forth twenty- three
recommendations, fifteen of which were approved unanimously by the
Commission. 130 Most of the findings are rather benign in nature and
merely call for clarity and consistency in Title IX enforcement by OCR.
However, a handful of the recommendations, if adopted, would make it
easier for schools to comply with Title IX by altering how institutions
pass the three-prong test of compliance. 131 As stated in the Commission's
findings, most school and college administrators feel that their
institutions must meet the proportionality test of the first prong to
ensure compliance under Title IX. 132 Many of the Commission's
recommendations directly cater to this pressure by making it easier for
schools to enjoy the first prong's "safe harbor." 133
Two other
recommendations target the third prong by allowing institutions to
conduct interest surveys or use high school participation ratios as a
means of demonstrating that an institution is fully and effectively
accommodating the interests of the underrepresented gender. 134 The last
recommendation by the Commission gives broad discretion to the
Secretary of Education to change the existing three-prong test. 135
After reviewing the Commission's recommendations, Secretary Paige
stated that he "intend[ ed] to move forward only on those
recommendations" that received unanimous support from the

125. Id. at 21-22.
126. !d. at 23-24.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

!d. at 25.
!d. at 25-27.
Jd. at 30-31.
Jd.app.6,at59-60.
See infra Part V. A, B.
!d. at 23.

133. See Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 37-40, Recommendations 14, 15, 17, 20 and an
unnumbered proposal, specifically directed at proportionality ratios.
134. See id. at 38-39, Recommendations 18 and 19.
135. See id. at 36 and 40, Recommendations 12 and 23.
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Commission. ur, As an administrative agency, DED is authorized to
promulgate its own rules and regulations "without approval from
Congress or the courts." 137 Therefore, after appropriate public notice and
response, the Secretary of Education can use his own discretion to adopt
and implement regulations under Title IX.
V.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS DILUTE TITLE IX'S
MANDATE OF PROHIBITING SEX DISCRIMINATION

The Secretary of Education has broad discretion in implementing
regulations concerning Title IX and, thus, could adopt Commission
recommendations that reduce athletic opportunities and scholarship
dollars to women and girls without approval from Congress or the
courts.ux Recommendations 14, 15, 17, 20, and an unnumbered
recommendation, are targeted at lowering the standard for satisfying the
substantial proportionality test.
Through disingenuous counting
requirements, these recommendations allow institutions to count relative
compliance, not substantial proportionality; to count illusions of
oppo tunities for women, not real opportunities; to not count actual
opportunities given to men; to exclude non-traditional students from
enrollment totals; and to reduce substantial proportionality to a 50:50
ratio. As these recommendations would dilute the requirement of
substantial proportionality at the cost of eliminating athletic
opportunities, scholarships, and recruiting budgets entitled to women,
they are inconsistent with Title IX and case law precedents. In addition,
Recommendations 18 and 19 impermissibly condone interest surveys as
a way for institutions to meet the third test of fully and effectively
accommodating the interests of the underrepresented sex, even though
such interest surveys have already been rejected by the courts as a
"measure of the very discrimination that is and has been the basis for
women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports." 139
Recommendations 18 and 19 contradict case law precedents, as well as
Title IX, by dismissing, rather than fully and effectively addressing, the
interests of girls and women.
Overall, these recommendations
manipulate how institutions comply with Title IX at the expense of

136. Sportslllustrated.com, Title IX Talk <http:/ /sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/2003/
02/26/title_ix_ap> (accessed feb. 26, 2003).
137. Marcia D. Greenberger, Co-Pres1dent, National Women's Law Center, Threats to Title IX
and Sports Opportunities ji>r Women and Girls 2 <http://www.nwlc.org/display.din'section=athletics>
(Mar.6,2003).
13R. /d.
139. Cohen II, I 0 I F.3d al 179.
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women's athletic opportunities. In effect, these manipulations rationalize
rather than eliminate sex discrimination.

A.

Recommendations Targeted at Manipulating the Numbers to Reach
the "Safe Harbor" of the Proportionality Prong

Although there are three ways to show compliance with Title IX as
set forth in the 1979 Policy Interpretations, universities and schools are
most interested in satisfying the first test of substantial proportionality,
known as the "safe harbor" in Title IX compliance. 140 In other words, if a
school's male/female ratio is substantially proportionate to the
male/female athletic opportunities, then the school is per se in
compliance with Title IX and no further investigation is required. 141 This
numerical analysis relies on hard data, which is easier to understand than
the other two more abstract tests. Athletic departments are pressured to
meet this test because it ensures compliance with Title IX and decreases
the likelihood of lawsuits and the withdrawal of federal funding. 142 This
undue pressure to meet prong one of Title IX compliance most likely
played a significant role m the Commission's findings and
recommendations, given
that
many of the
Commission's
recommendations are directly targeted at diluting the substantial
proportionality test, thereby making it easier for institutions to attain this
"safe harbor." 143
Recommendation 14 directly attacks the substantial proportionality
requirement by suggesting that OCR allow for a reasonable variance in
the relative ratios in order to comply with Title IX. 144 As reason for the
change, the Commission asserts that, in practice, the courts and OCR
have required strict proportionality rather than substantial
proportionality. 145
This is clearly not true.
The substantial
proportionality standard first appeared in the 1979 Policy Interpretations
and has been interpreted by the courts and OCR on many occasions, but
never has it been interpreted to mean strict numerical proportions. 111'
140. Cohen I, 991 f.2d at H97.
141. ld.at898.
142. Jd.
143. Sec Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 37-40, Recommendations 14, 15, 17, 20, and an
unnumbered proposal.
144.

/d. at 37.

145. !d.
146. See Neal, 198 F. 3d at 763, 765, 768 (where court accepted a five percentage-point gap
between female student ratio and female athlete ratio); Roberts, 998 F.2d at S29 (where the court
noted that OCR does not require a "set ratio" but "that substantial proportionality entails a t;tirly
close relationship between athletic participation and undergraduate enrollment" (citation omillcd)).
See Clarification lvlenw, supra n. 99, at 6.
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The courts interpret substantial proportionality on a case specific basis
and seem unwilling to set clear demarcations on what constitutes
substantial proportionality, noting that the standard should be flexible
with regards to the circumstances of each particular institution. 147
However, case law does give some indication as to what the courts
consider to be substantial proportionality. In Roberts v. Colorado State
Board of Agriculture, 14 H the Tenth Circuit found that the University's
10.5% disparity between enrollment and athletic participation did not
meet the substantial proportionality test. 149 The court also reviewed
OCR's three-year compliance review of Colorado State, which found
disparities of 7.5%, 12.5% and 12.7%, which also did not meet the test's
requirements. 1511 The Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have addressed
substantial proportionality, holding that 13%, 20% and 25%, respectively,
did not satisfy substantial proportionality. 151 In Neal v. Board of Trustees
of the California State Universities, 152 the Ninth Circuit found the
University in violation of Title IX due to a 25% disparity in enrollment
and athletic opportunities for women. 153 The initial lawsuit settled out of
court, resulting in a consent decree mandating that the University
implement and maintain a "proportion of female athletes that was within
five percentage points of the proportion of female undergraduate
students at [the] school." 154 Even though the courts do not subscribe to
particular demarcations on what constitutes substantial proportionality,
they are readily equipped to make these appropriate individualized
147. Sec cases cited in note 146. In addition, arbitrary percentages of compliance can mean
entirely different things to different institutions. for example, University A has a student body
make-up of 52% males and 48% females. The University has one thousand students in its athletic
program and the break down is 62% males and 38% females. This 10% disparity denies women one
hundred athletic spots as compared to their overall enrollment. In contrast, University B has the
same student body make-up, but they have only one hundred student athletes. If University B has a
10% disparity in athletic participation it would only deny spots to ten women. Under the
Clarification Memo, University B may be found to have obtained substantial proportionality because
ten women may not be sufficient to support a viable team. Yet, University A would most likely not
meet Title IX's substantial proportionality test because the one hundred women denied an athletic
spot could easily be found to be sufficient to support a viable team(s). Therefore, it is apparent that
substantial proportionality must be determined on a case specific basis.

Roberts, 998 r.2d at H24.
!d. at 829.
I ~0. Id. at 830.
151. Favia v. Ir1d. U. of Pa., 7 F.3d at 332, 343 (3d Cir. 1993) (where student body was 56%
female but athlete population would only be 43% female under university's plan); Pederson, 213 F.3d
at 87H (where student population is 49% female but "the population participating in athletics is ...
29% female"); Neal, l 98 r. 3d at 763, 765, 768 (where females comprised 64% of student population
but only 39'Yr, of athlete population).
152. Neal, !9R F.3d at 763.
15.l. /d. at 765.
154. Id.
14K
149.
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determinations.
Case law serves as a rough guideline for what may numerically
constitute substantial proportionality; however, case law also
demonstrates that the standard is flexible and that courts do allow for
some variance. 155 As the above case law indicates, Recommendation 14,
which garnished full consensus by the Commission, may be vulnerable to
being overturned by the courts based on past precedent interpreting
substantial proportionality more narrowly than the recommended
reasonable variance. 156
Further, OCR has stated that substantial proportionality should be
determined through a flexible, case specific analysis. 157
OCR's
Investigator's Manual instructs Title IX compliance investigators that
"there is no set ratio that constitutes 'substantially proportionate' or that,
when not met, results in a disparity or a violation." 15H The manual merely
advises that there needs to be a fairly close relationship between the two
ratios. 159 The 1996 OCR Clarification Memo specifically states that "it
may be unreasonable to expect an institution to achieve exact
proportionality" due to natural fluctuations in enrollment and
participation rates. 160 In addition, the memo recognizes that substantial
proportionality would occur "when the number of opportunities ...
required to achieve proportionality would not be sufficient to sustain a
viable team," 161 allowing some flexibility in the standard. Moreover,
OCR explains that substantial proportionality is institution specific and
such a determination is properly made on a case-by-case analysis and not
through a statistical test. 162
The Commission's recommendation to allow reasonable variance in
substantial proportionality would unnecessarily find institutions to be in
compliance with this test under Title IX without actually providing equal
opportunities for women. 163 The adoption of such a recommendation
155. See supra nn. 146-54 and accompanying text.
156. See id.
!57. Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 6.
158. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829-30 (citing Investigator's Manual, supra n. 67, at 24.).
159. !d. at 830.
160. Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 6.
161. Id. at 7.
162. Id. at 6.
163. This recommendation is reported as having unanimous support by all Commissioners.
However, two Commissioners, Donna de Varona and Julie Foudy, submitted a minority report
clarifying that upon further review of the recommendation they withdrew their support due to the
"damaging results that would not be consistent with Title IX." Donna de Varona & Julie Foudy,
Minority Views on the Report of the Commission on Opportunity in Athletics 15
<http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/MinorityReportfeb26.pdf>) (feb. 26, 2003) /hereinafter Minority
Report].
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would change the current standard from a narrowly-construed, objective
standard based on enrollment to an open-ended, subjective standard
based on the Secretary of Education's judgment. 1M The broad language
used by the Commission indicates that the Secretary of Education could
make such determinations arbitrarily without considering case specific
factors or circumstances-a notion rejected by both the courts and
OCR. 165 Further, current interpretations by the courts and OCR have
already built flexibility into the test, obviating the Commission's relative
variance standard. 166 This new standard would result in a loss of
opportunities for women in athletics because institutions would be given
too much latitude in meeting the first prong of the Title IX test. 167 By
lowering the standard, institutions would impermissibly be in the "safe
harbor" of Title IX compliance with no incentive to provide equal
participation opportunities to women, which is inconsistent with Title
IX's purpose and mandate.
Recommendations 15, 17, and 20 are also aimed at lowering the
standard of compliance under the first prong and accomplish this goal
through
unique counting and mathematic manipulations. 168
Recommendation 15 would allow substantial proportionality to be
measured based on the ratio of the school's enrollment to a
predetermined number of athletic participation slots allotted. 169 The
Commission Report notes that this would allow a school to demonstrate
available athletic opportunities "[e]ven if the slots a program makes
available are not filled." 170 Again, the Commission is remiss in honoring
Title IX's clear purpose--to provide equal opportunities to members of
both sexes. This recommendation conflicts with clear case law precedent
and current OCR practices. 171
The courts have firmly recognized that athletic participation
opportunities "must be real, not illusory." 172 In Williams v. School
District of Bethlehem, 173 the plaintiffs sued the school district on behalf of
their minor son, challenging the exclusion of their son from girls' field

164.

ld.

165.

Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829-30; Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 6.

166. See supra nn. 146-54 and accompanying text.
167.

Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 15.

168. See infra nn. 169-229 and accompanying text.
169. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 37.
170. ld.
172.

Williams, 998 f'.2d at 170; Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 3.
Clarijication Memo, supra n. 99, at 3. See Williams, 998 F.2d at 170; Cohen II, 101 F.3d at

173.

Williams, 998 F.2d at 168.

171.
167.

176
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hockey. 174 The Third Circuit's analysis focused on whether a male could
The 1979 Policy
be excluded from a single-sex female team. 175
Interpretations explain that a school must allow a member of the
excluded sex to try out for a single-sex team only if the athletic
opportunities of the excluded sex have previously been limited. 176 The
district court focused on whether boys at Liberty High School were
previously limited, 177 holding that the boys had been limited because girls
had been able to try out for more teams than boys for two decades. 1n On
appeal, the Third Circuit rejected this flawed analysis by stating:
The mere opportunity to try out for a team ... is not determinative of the
question of previously limited athletic opportunities under Title IX.
Athletic Opportunities means real opportunities, not illusory ones. If, to
satisfy [sic] Title IX, all that the School District [was] required to do was to
allow girls to try out for boys' teams, then it need not have made efforts ...
to equalize the numbers of sports teams offered for boys and girls. 17Y
Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment and
remanded for further fact-finding. 180 The court found that compliance
with Title IX cannot be measured simply by comparing numbers, but
instead found that the analysis should center on "the benefits, treatment,
services, or opportunities afforded male and female athletes in the
institution's program as a whole." 181 Because Recommendation IS's
straw man slots conflict with case law stating that participation
opportunities must be real, Recommendation 15 would most likely be
rejected by the courts.
Current OCR guidelines specifically prohibit institutions from
counting unfilled slots because OCR "must consider actual benefits
provided to real students." 182 Because, as already established, compliance
under Title IX is not just merely satisfying numerical amounts, OCR
considers the quality and kind of benefits actually provided to student
athletes. 1R3 If only slots were counted, an institution could be found in
compliance with Title IX without any actual students benefiting; such a
practice would be insufficient for Title IX compliance under OCR's

174. Id. at 170.
175.

ld. at 172.

176. ld.
177. ld. at 174.
178. ld.
179. Id. at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. ld. at 180.
181. Id. at 176 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. at 71417).
182. Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 3.
183. ld.
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standards. 1x4 Again, Recommendation 15 is vulnerable to rejection not
only by case law precedent, but also by current standards of enforcement.
In addition to conflicting with case law and OCR's 1996 Clarification
Memo, 1xs Recommendation 15 de facto modifies the safe harbor of
substantial proportionality by diminishing real participation
opportunities afforded to women, such as the allocation of funding. 1x6
Currently, Division I colleges allocate 32% of their recruiting budgets to
women's teams. 1x7 As a result of this recruiting disparity, fewer women
than men receive athletic opportunities. Jxx Therefore, if an institution
could set a predetermined, but unfilled, number of slots for its women's
teams, it would be given credit for meeting Title IX compliance without
giving women actual participation opportunities and without expending
similar recruiting budgets. 1x9
Overall, Recommendation 15 could change an institution's ability to
comply with substantial proportionality. For example, a school could
more easily find itself in Title IX's "safe harbor," giving the institution no
incentive to address unequal recruiting treatment, and women would
continue to be denied equal opportunities. 190 This recommendation is
inconsistent with Title IX's purpose of eliminating sex discrimination in
educational opportunities. 191 Title IX is not interested in illusions of
equality for women, but rather mandates that there be actual equal
opportunities for women in athletics. 1n The recommendation that
allows unfilled slots to meet the requirements of Title IX condones
pervasive discrimination and unequal treatment of women by
manipulating the numbers without really addressing the underlying issue
that women are not being given equal opportunities. 193 At the most,
Recommendation 15 is a mirage of compliance with Title IX, and such
illusions have been firmly rejected by the courts and OCR.
Another recommendation directed towards manipulating actual
participation opportunities is Recommendation 17, which excludes walkon athletes from athletic ratios. 194 In essence, this recommendation is the
1S4. /d.
ISS. See supra nn. 146-54 and accompanying text.
1R6. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 13.
187. /d. at 13 (citing NCAA (;ender Equity Report, 1999-2000, at 15).
188. /d.
189. /d.
190. ld.
191. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
192. 20 U.S.C. §1681. In addition, courts that have interpreted Title IX have also expressed
that opportunities must be real. Williams, 998 F.2d at I70 and Cohen II, IOI F.3d at 167.
193. Minority Report, supra n. I63, at 13.
I 94. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 38.
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inverse of Recommendation 15, allowing schools not to count athletic
opportunities for men that the school actually provides. 195 In doing so,
the deflated athletic rosters would be proportional to the student
enrollment to satisfy the first compliance test.
Based on the
Commission's findings regarding walk-on athletes, "artificial limitations
on the number of walk-ons may limit opportunities without any
corresponding gain for the underrepresented sex." 196 Ironically, this
conclusion is not based on any statistical analysis 197 and should be
discredited in its entirety. The Commission further explained that roster
management, a practice of limiting the number of men that can walk on
to a team, controls the appearance of disproportional participation, but
does not create any actual benefit to women. 19x In other words,
unlimited walk-ons will not fix the underlying issue of disproportional
participation of women, but instead only masks the problem. Therefore,
it was illogical for the Commission to even recommend that walk-ons not
be counted, when the Commission found that such a practice does not
correspond to any benefit in disparate participation. 199
To date, the courts have not been faced with the issue of how to hide
walk-on athletes from an institution's overall athletics participation
numbers. However, case law does indicate that intercollegiate athletics
opportunities "should be measured by counting actual participants"
without distinguishing between scholarship and walk-on athletes. 21111 The
courts have recognized that team size can vary throughout the athletic
season based on injuries, cuts, and quits. 201 Therefore, team roster
participants should be determined at the end of the completed season
and should acknowledge those members that played for a majority of the
season, whether they are bench-warmers or core players. 202 Moreover,
the courts have applied a common sense application:
Where both the athlete and coach determine that there is a place on the
team for a student, it is not for [the courts] to second-guess their

195. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 13. The Minority Report's Finding 17 implies that "men
walk on more than women." /d. at 10.
196. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 38.
197. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 30. The Commission's finding begins by stating,
"[a]lthough no statistical analysis of this issue has been perf(Jrmed, there has been much testimony
about the relative rates at which men and women walk on to teams." /d.
198. !d.
199. ld.

200. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 167 (emphasis added) (quoting Cohen v. Brown U., 879 F. Supp. 185,
202-03 (D.R.l. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
201. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 192.
202. !d.
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judgment and impose its own, or anyone else's, definition of a valuable
or genuine varsity experience. It is the nature of a team that each
student makes a different contribution to the team's success and takes
from it a unique experience. Every varsity member is therefore a varsity
"participant." 203

Because courts most likely count actual team players during the
season, Recommendation 17 may face rejection by courts that do not
distinguish between scholarship recipients and walk-on athletes in
assessing substantial proportionality.
In addition, the courts may
consider that walk-on athletes receive the same benefits of sports
participation as full or partial scholarship recipients and recruited walkons.204 After all, the institution's resources are spread among all
participants-whether "official" athletes or merely walk-ons.
Importantly, the Commission found that male athletes are more
likely to walk on to teams than female athletes. 205
Therefore,
Recommendation 17 specifically benefits male athletes rather than
women because these walk-on male athletes, which are not counted in
the institution's proportionality ratio, still receive the benefits of
coaching, training, equipment, tutors, and uniforms. 206
In fact,
Recommendation 17 denies women necessary resources because the
institution now has to shift money and resources away from funding
women athletes in order to make up for the unreported male walk-ons. 207
The courts are at liberty to consider various factors in determining Title
IX compliance and will most likely see through Recommendation 17's
veil of compliance, recognizing that an athlete is a participant-whether
recruited or not.
Recommendation 17 could also have far-reaching, damaging effects
on women who attend institutions where scholarships are not provided
to athletes-high schools and Division III colleges. 20 x Under this
recommendation, only full or partial scholarship athletes and recruited
walk-ons count in the institution's proportionality ratio. 209 In the case of
Division lii colleges, only recruited walk-ons would be counted and the
NCAA does not monitor contacts between coaches and prospective
students at this level. 210 Therefore, there would be no way to monitor or

203.

Jd. (emphasis added).

204. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 13.
205. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 30-31.
206. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 13-14.
207. /d.
208. /d.
209. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 38.
210. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14.
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differentiate between recruited and non-recruited walk-on athletes,
making it easier for a school to claim that their athletes are not recruited
in order to comply with this recommendation.2ll This loophole would
swallow Title IX in its entirety on Division III campuses. Overall,
Recommendation 17 enables schools to pretend to comply with Title IX
by not counting all athletic opportunities for men and reducing their
obligation to female athletes. 212
The most egregious manipulation by the Commission of the
proportionality prong is Recommendation 20. This recommendation
deflates the student enrollment numbers by excluding non-traditional
students from the school's undergraduate population. 213 Conveniently,
the Commission defines non-traditional students as those students not
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, and students of any age
who have children. 214 Data indicates that women outnumber men by 37
percent as individuals over twenty-four enrolled in degree-granting
institutions. 215 Therefore, Recommendation 20 looks neutral on its face,
but in effect will disparately impact women athletes by excluding a large
portion of women to be counted towards enrollment numbers. 216 Even
though the Supreme Court has held that discriminatory effect is not
sufficient to maintain a sex discrimination case, 217 the Court has

211.

ld.

212.

ld.

213. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 39.
214. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14.
215. Id. (citing U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics
<http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/digest200 l/tables/dt174.asp> ).
216. An example illustrating this point may be more helpful in understanding the effects of
Recommendation 20. At University A the undergraduate student population is 54% females and
46% males, which is substantially proportionate to 54% women athletes and 46% male athletes.
However, University A has a large number of non-traditional students as undergraduates. These
students are then excluded from the overall student population. Since data indicates that women
outnumber men as non-traditional students, more women are excluded from University A's student
body population. Therefore, the newly configured student body population is 49% females and 51 '!1,
males with corresponding athletic opportunities. Under Recommendation 20, women athletes at
University A have the potential to lose 5% of their athletic opportunities merely by excluding nontraditional students. Therefore, Recommendation 20 may look neutral on its face, but it has the
potential of unfairly impacting women by denying them required athletic opportunities.
217. Personnel Adminstr. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). Feeney challenged a
Massachusetts civil service statute which gave an absolute hiring preference to any veteran who
obtained a passing score on particular examination. At the time of the suit, 98 percent of veterans in
Massachusetts were men, meaning that the law benefited males while detrimentally effecting females.
The Court held that the statute was not intentionally gender-based and only purposeful
discrimination against women would give rise to an equal protection violation. Moreover, the Court
stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results." ld. at 273. See
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 ( 1977) (holding that racially
discriminatory intent or purpose must be motivating factor in order to strike down rezoning plan).

155]

MANIPULATING TITLE IX

181

determined that discriminatory impact will be a factor in analyzing the
underlying discriminatory purpose behind a law. 218 As Recommendation
20 is directed at weakening compliance under Title IX, it seems likely
that the discriminatory impact of Recommendation 20, coupled with
overall weakening of Title IX enforcement, may be sufficient to prove the
discriminatory intent necessary to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Furthermore, "as applied" challenges could be used to show that the
government has enforced a neutral-sounding provision in a way that
discriminates against women, which would also be sufficient for midlevel gender review under the Equal Protection Clause. 219
In addition, Recommendation 20's classification of students with
children as "nontraditional" students is outright discrimination in and of
itself. Furthermore, this classification can be seen as discrimination
against women because female students are most readily identifiable with
children. The impact of this recommendation would be to deflate the
number of women enrolled and, thus, artificially inflate the proportion of
women participating in athletics. 220 Again, this disparate impact is a
pretext to sex discrimination against women by excluding them from
opportunities rightfully theirs under the proportionality test of Title
IX. 221 Further, there is no way to fairly implement this rule. 222 Would an
institution be prepared to do background checks on all of its students to
see who had mothered or fathered a child? 223 The Commission clearly
did not think this recommendation through very well.
Two of the Commissioners released a Minority Report in which they
articulated another objection to Recommendation 20. 224 The Minority
Report explains that this recommendation is impermissibly based on
stereotypes that students over a certain age or with children are not
interested in participating in sports. 225 The Supreme Court has been clear
that it will strike down classifications based on faulty generalizations or
stereotypes. 226
The Minority Report concludes that "[t]his
218. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976) (holding that discriminatory purpose must
be proven to show racial discrimination that violates the equal protection clause and that
disproportionate impact is a factor in ascertaining intent).
219. See f.E.B. v. Ala., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994) (holding that intentional discrimination on
basis of gender by state actors violates the equal protection clause).
220. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14.
221. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71418.
222. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14.
223. An institution may be surprised to find out that john Doe superstar quarterback is the
father of three children.
224. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14.
225. Id. at 14.
226. See U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 533 {1996) (holding that generalizations about women no
longer justify denying opportunities to women who have talent and capacity outside the average
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recommendation would allow every school to presume, for purposes of
Title IX, that all students who are over the age of twenty-four or who
have children are uninterested in playing sports." 227
Although
Recommendation 20 merely seems to exclude non-traditional students
from the overall enrolled-student-to-athlete ratio, it is unclear whether
non-traditional students would also be excluded from participating in
athletics altogether. Furthermore, Title IX requires consideration of the
interests of an institution's students, traditional or non-traditional, in
allocating athletic opportunities.nx If Recommendation 20 precludes this
type of consideration, then it violates the clear intent of Title IX to
establish equal protection under the law for all students.m Thus,
Recommendation 20 is seriously flawed because ( 1) it will have a
disparate impact on women athletes, (2) it is based on impermissible
stereotypes, and (3) it violates the clear intent of equal protection under
Title IX.
The last recommendation aimed at meeting the standard of
proportionality is an unnumbered proposal that received a tie vote from
the Commissioners. 230 This recommendation would permit institutions
to allocate 50% of their participation opportunities to men and women
respectively, 231 but would also allow institutions a 2 to 3% variance in
complying with the 50% ceiling. 232 Since the recommendation received a
tie vote, the Commission neither approved nor disapproved the
recommendation, indicating that there are obvious concerns with the
rule. 233 The Commission Report notes that this recommendation would
provide a more quantifiable goal for compliance while allowing flexibility
due to uncontrolled changes in athletic programs. 234
Even if this rule were to be adopted, it may not satisfy the
proportionality prong to which it is directed. 235 For example, if a school
has a student body population of 64% female to 36% male, a 50:50
athletic roster would not be "substantially proportionate" as required
under the first test of compliance. 23 " Furthermore, this rule sets a ceiling
on participation and scholarship opportunities to both men and women,
description).
227. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14.
228. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71418.
229. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
230.

Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 40.

231.

Id.

232. id.
233.

Id.

234. Jd.
235. Seegenerally44 Fed. Reg. at 71418.
236.

See supra nn. 140-62 and accompanying text.
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no matter how large of a percentage they represent in their respective
student body. 237 In practice, an institution comprised of 60% male and
40% female would probably never be willing to cap their men's teams and
allow women to have more opportunities than required by their relative
student body proportion.
The Minority Report also notes that the 2 to 3% variance from the
50% standard would in effect allow schools to impose a ceiling at 47% for
women athletes. 23 H This would result in a loss of opportunities to women
and girls under the current law, given that women comprise 53% of
student bodies at Division IA schools and 49% at high schools. 239 The 2
to 3% variance may set a lower-than-required ceiling, but at the same
time it also sets a floor to athletic opportunities for women. Therefore,
institutions could not slip below this 47% and athletic departments
should be striving for 50:50 opportunities. 240 Again, the Commission's
apparent motive behind this recommendation was to give noncompliant
institutions a way to manipulate the numerical data in order to be found
in compliance. 241 Consequently, this recommendation would result in
the denial of athletic opportunities to women by allowing the
continuance of on-going sexual discrimination in our nation's
educational environments. 242
In conclusion, each of these recommendations appears to be targeted
at lowering the substantial proportionality standard by manipulating
how institutions count athletic opportunities. These manipulations
reduce athletic opportunities for women and in effect mask the
underlying issue-that sex discrimination still occurs in athletics today.
These disingenuous counting methods rationalize and justify
discrimination against women rather than prohibiting such sex
discrimination.

237.

Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 40.

238.

Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 15.

239.

Id.

240. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 40.
241. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 15.
242.

ld.
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B.
Recommendations Impermissibly Allowing Interest
Surveys as a Means of Full and Effective Accommodation
under the Third Compliance Prong
The third independent way to show compliance with Title IX is by
demonstrating that the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex
OCR's 1996
have been fully and effectively accommodated. 243
Clarification Memo explains that there is a presumption that
disproportionately high male participation rates may indicate that the
institution is not providing equal athletic opportunities, but that an
institution can rebut said presumption under test three by showing that
the imbalance does not reflect discrimination. 244 Such evidence must
demonstrate that the institution has fully and effectively accommodated
the interests of the underrepresented sex. 245 OCR is to consider three
factors when making its assessment under this test: "whether there is (a)
unmet interest in a particular sport; (b) sufficient ability to sustain a team
in the sport; and (c) a reasonable expectation of competition for the
team." 246
The Secretary's Commission found that administrators were unsure
how to assess student interest in athletics and were uncertain about the
propriety of using interest surveys to measure student interests. 247 The
Commission found that institutions did not understand whether they
had to exactly match these interest levels and whether they had to
approve every request for a new women's team regardless of financial
limitations. 248 Based on these findings, the Commission proposed
Recommendations 18 and 19 to address any confusion under the third
compliance test. 249 However, these two recommendations directly
conflict with standing case law precedents and abruptly diverge from
current OCR policies.
Recommendation 18 inappropriately allows institutions to conduct
interest surveys as a way of "(1) demonstrating compliance with the
three-part test, (2) allowing schools to accurately predict and reflect
men's and women's interest in athletics over time, and (3) stimulating
student interest in varsity sports." 250 The Commission noted that the
criteria for such interest surveys should be guided by OCR and that this
243. 44 fed. Reg. at 71418.
244. Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 9-10.
245. !d.
246. !d. at I 0.
247. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 26.
248.

Id.

249. Id. at 38-39.
250. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 38.
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recommendation would allow institutions to have a quantifiable way to
show compliance with the third test. 251 Interest surveys may provide
quantifiable data, but the courts have specifically rejected the use of
surveys in this regard. 252 In the Cohen cases, the First Circuit twice
rejected Brown University's use of relative interest as a way to comply
with full and effective accommodation. 253 In Cohen I, the court stated
that Brown's interest surveys would "begin under circumstances where
men's athletic teams have a considerable head start," which would not
accurately measure the true interests of women. 254 In Cohen II, the court
more emphatically stated,
[T]here exists the danger that, rather than providing a true measure
of women's interest in sports, statistical evidence purporting to reflect
women's interest instead provides only a measure of the very
discrimination that is and has been the basis for women's lack of
opportunity to participate in sports. . . . [T]o allow a numbers-based
lack-of-interest defense to become the instrument of further
discrimination against the underrepresented gender would pervert the
remedial purpose of Title IX. We conclude that, even if it can be
empirically demonstrated that ... women have less interest in sports than
do men, such evidence, standing alone, cannot justify providing fewer
athletics opportunities for women than for men. Furthermore, such
evidence is completely irrelevant where ... viable and successful women's
varsity teams have been demoted or eliminated. 255
Cohen's rejection of interest surveys has been followed in other
circuits. 256 For example, in Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletic
Association, the Sixth Circuit cautioned that reliance on interest may be
gender-neutral, but "it is a method which has great potential for
perpetuating gender-based discrimination." 257
Thus, Recommendation 18 is inherently flawed for many reasons.
First, as mentioned above, interest surveys have been rejected by the
courts as a way of perpetuating sex discrimination. 25 x Second, interest
surveys in essence force women to prove their interest in athletics before
being given their right to equal opportunity to play under the law. 259

251. Jd.
252. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179-80.
253. Jd.
254. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 900.
255. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179-80.
256. Neal, 198 F.3d at 768; Horner, 43 F.3d at 273.
257.

Horner, 43 F.3d at 273.

258. See supra nn. 250-55 and accompanying text.
259. Minority Report, supra n. 169, at 16.
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Third, interest surveys are based on the notion that women are not as
likely to be interested in athletics. 260 This notion rests on impermissible
stereotypes, which have been unequivocally rejected by the Supreme
Court. 261 Fourth, evidence indicates that women are not any less
interested in athletics than men when the doors of opportunity are
open. 262 Prior to Title IX's enactment, women's participation totaled
300,000 in high school sports and fewer than 32,000 in intercollegiate
athletics. Today there are 2.8 million girls participating in high school
athletics and approximately 170,000 women in college sports. 263 Title IX
has opened the door for women to demonstrate their interest in athletics;
interest surveys, as suggested in Recommendation 18, would only close
the door of discrimination on women again.
While not as egregious as Recommendation 18, Recommendation 19
also relies on potential interest surveys to assess interest.
Recommendation 19 would allow institutions to demonstrate
compliance with the third test by utilizing ratios of male/female athletic
participation in the surrounding area or surveys of prospective or
enrolled students' interest. 264 Again, the only justification for such a
recommendation is that the Commission notes that this approach would
allow institutions to quantify compliance. 265
There are several problems with Recommendation 19. First, while
quantifiable data is easy to administer, on-going sex discrimination is not
so easily quantified. The third test is not designed to be an easy numbers
game; rather it is intended to be more abstract and flexible in addressing
sex discrimination against women. 266
Second, this recommendation is very ambiguous in what it permits.
Recommendation 19 could be read to allow interest surveys to be used to
demonstrate the abilities and interest of the underrepresented sex. 267 But,
as stated above, interest surveys would only perpetuate sex
discrimination. 26 x This recommendation could also be read to allow
"relative" accommodation based on trends, rather than the requisite full
and effective accommodation. 269 However, relative accommodation has

260. Id.
261. Sec supra n. 226 and accompanying text.
262. Minority Report, supra n. 169, at 17.
263. NWLC Battle, supra n. 2, at 2.
264.

Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 39.

265. Id.
266. 44 Fed. Reg. al41718; Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 9.
267. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 17.
268.

See supra nn. 250-55 and accompanying text.

269. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 17.
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been specifically rejected by appellate courts, holding that comparative
levels of interest rests on the overgeneralization that men are more
interested in athletics than women. 270 This impermissible stereotype has
disadvantaged women and undermined the remedial purpose of Title IX
by limiting required program expansion for the underrepresented sex to
the status quo level of relative interest. 271
Third, Recommendation 19 would permit institutions to compare
their participation rates with the participation rates of the region, state,
nation, or national governing body. 272 Title IX, however, is institution
specific, requiring institutions to provide equal athletic opportunities to
its students. 273 The third test requires institutions to demonstrate that the
interests and abilities of its students have been fully and effectively
accommodated, not whether outside third-party interests have been
accommodated. 274 OCR's Clarification Memo explains that "the [1979]
Policy Interpretation does not require an institution to accommodate the
interests and abilities of potential students." 275 Using other schools or
states as a standard is inappropriate because it violates the purpose of
Title IX. The courts and OCR have set forth adequate guidance on how
the tr ird test of compliance should be administered, and these current
practices should remain intact.
In summary, Recommendations 18 and 19 impermissibly condone
interest surveys as a way for institutions to meet the third test of fully and
effectively accommodating the interests of the underrepresented sex.
Interest surveys have been rejected by the courts as a "measure of the
very discrimination that is and has been the basis for women's lack of
opportunity to participate in sports." 276 Recommendations 18 and 19,
therefore, contradict case law precedents and Title IX by dismissing,
rather than fully and effectively addressing, the interests of girls and
women.

270. Neal, 198 !'.3d at 768-70; Cohen 1, 991 F.2d at 898-99. The Cohen 1 court noted that
Brown's relative interest approach reads the "full" out of the duty to accommodate "fully and
effectively." Prong three requires "not merely some accommodation, but full and effective
accommodation." Cohen/, 991 F.2d at 989.
271. Cohen I/, 101 !'.3d at 174 (citing Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 209).
272.

Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 39.

273. 44 Fed. Reg. at 41718.
274. 44 l'ed. Reg. at 41718; Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 9.
275.
276.

Clarijlcation Memo, supra n. 99, at 9.
Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179.
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CONCLUSION -CURRENT TITLE IX POLICIES EFFECT! VEL Y
PROMOTE BOTH MEN's AND WOMEN's ATHLETICS

Title IX has been cited as the "most successful civil rights statute in
history." 277
Through Title IX implementation and enforcement,
opportunities for women to participate in athletics have substantially
increased, while at the same time men's participation has increased as
well.m Currently, 150,916 college women and 2.78 million high school
girls participate in competitive athletics and 208,408 college men and
3.92 million high school boys participate in athletics. 279 Even though
Title IX has leveled the playing field somewhat for women and girls,
there still is much to be done to achieve equality. 280 Women still lag in
participation opportunities, scholarship dollars, budgets, and other
aspects of sports programming. 281 Therefore, although complete equality
has not been achieved, Title IX is working in its current form and current
Title IX policies effectively promote both men's and women's
participation opportunities equally.
Under Title IX's current policies, institutions can comply with
athletic participation in one of three ways. 282 This flexibility allows
institutions a choice in which test they choose to employ to comply with
Title IX. 283 In addition, none of these three standards requires schools to
cut teams and each test can be achieved by expanding opportunities for
the underrepresented sex. 284 Seven out of ten adults familiar with Title IX
think that Title IX should be strengthened or left alone. 285 Myles Brand,

277. Joanna Grossman, The Future of Title IX. The Federal Statute Concerning Gender Equality
in Athletics: Can it Survive the Secretary of Education's Planned Revisions? <http:/ /writ.findlaw.com/
grossman/2003031l.html> (Mar. 11, 2003).
278. NWLC Battle, supra n. 2, at 5.
279. Id. at 2.
280. Id. at 17.
281. National Women's Law Center, Quick Facts on Women and Girls in Athletics
<http://www.nwlc.org/display.cfm?section=athletics> (June, 2002). There are 2.78 million girls that
participate in high school athletics as compared to 3.92 million boys. In college, 150,916 women
compete compared to 208,408 men. Id. In college, women receive only 43% of all athletic
scholarships dollars. In Divisions I and II women received at least $133 million less in scholarship
dollars than men. Id. Women's scholarships totaled $372 million while men's totaled $505 million
per year. I d. Women only receive 36% of operating budgets and 32% of recruiting dollars. Jd. In
2000 for Division I institutions, for every dollar spent on women's sports, almost two dollars were
spent on men's sports. Id.
282. See supra nn. 78-88 and accompanying text.
283. Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 2.
284. Id. at II.
285. Erik Brady, Poll: Most Adults Want Title IX Law Left Alone, USA Today,
<http:/ /www.usatoday.com/ sports/ college/other/2003-01-07 -title-ix_x.htm> (last updated Jan. 7,
2003).
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President of the NCAA, has also opposed any changes to Title IX stating,
"Title IX needs to remain in place in its current form in order to achieve
full gender equity." 286 Brand also states that he would only support those
recommendations that make it easier to enforce Title IX. 287
The Commission on Opportunity in Athletics' findings and
recommendations should be carefully reviewed and many of the
recommendations
should
be
rejected
in
their
entirety.
Recommendations that manipulate compliance under Title IX only
rationalize discrimination against women. Thus, instead of weakening
polices under Title IX, the DED is correct in focusing on educating
institutions and the public on the importance of Title IX and the need to
keep striving to achieve sexual equality. 288 Further, the DED has
reaffirmed its commitment to Title IX and has stated that "it will
aggressively enforce Title IX standards, including implementing
sanctions for institutions that do not comply." 289
Equal opportunity for girls and boys and women and men is crucial
to our nation and Title IX promotes this equality in educational
settings. 290 The opportunity to participate in athletics reaches beyond the
playing field into increased health, self-confidence, academic
performance, and leadership skills. 291 Thus, to further equality in the
educational setting and to achieve such desirable attributes as mentioned
above, Title IX must be preserved and enforced in its current form for
school athletics to be truly "open to all."
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